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Disabled children’s rights in every day life: Problematising
notions of competency and promoting self-empowerment
JOHN DAVIS1 & NICK WATSON2
1Research Unit in Health and Behavioural Change, University of Edinburgh, RUHBC;
2Department of Nursing Studies, University of Edinburgh
Introduction
Children’s rights in Scotland are covered by a number of Acts, Rules, Regu-
lations and Guidance which include: the Children (Scotland) Act (1995),
the Adoption (Scotland) Act 1978, Children’s Hearings1 (Scotland) Rules
1996, the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991, educational guidelines,
Rules and Acts relating to the Court of Session and the Sheriff Court, regula-
tions relating to adoption, fostering, residential childcare and child protection,
recent amendments brought about by the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 and
the recently enacted Standards in Scotland’s Schools etc. (Scotland) Act
2000. Despite this protective web2 (which we will refer to as guidance and
legislation) there is still much uncertainty surrounding how children’s rights
are upheld in practice. Whilst the guidance and legislation (post the UN
Convention on the Rights of The Child) stresses the importance of taking the
child’s views into account, it also contains caveats that can be used to limit
a child’s ability to have his or her voice heard and taken account of during a
variety of proceedings and in different settings (Marshall 1997; Tisdall 1997).
We find that very often in Scotland the wording of guidance and legislation
 RUHBC is funded by the Chief Scientist Office of the Scottish Executive Health Depart-
ment (SEHD) and the Health Education Board of Scotland (HEBS). The opinions expressed
in this paper are those of the authors, not of SEHD or HEBS.
1 1968 Social Work (Scotland) Act set up the Children’s Hearing system in Scotland.
Marshall (1997) describes it as a unique system to deal with young offenders and issues of
child care and protection. In consists of three members of the public appointed to a children’s
panel who meet with the child, parents and other professionals. The aim is to attend to the
needs of the child through informal procedure, with disputes that arise between parties being
settled by court. All sides are expected to contribute to discussion and where a child’s rights
conflict with that of the parent a ‘safeguarder’ acts on behalf of the child.
2 There is a difference between guidance and legislation; most of the recommendations
which suggest that children should be included in decision making processes come in the
form of guidance. This means that it does not have the same legal force as legislation (Tisdall,
personal communication).
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includes provisos such as: ‘taking into account age and maturity’,3 ‘when in
the child’s best interest’, ‘wherever possible’, or ‘where costs are not prohibi-
tive’. This means that many institutions have ‘get out clauses’ when it comes
to including children. For example, schools were given exemption from the
Children (Scotland) Act 1995 requirement that those providing services from
children should take account of their views (Children in Scotland 1999) and
the Standards in Scottish Schools etc (Scotland) Act 2000 states that schools
only have to say whether they consulted children about their development
plans, there being no requirement that they should consult children. Despite
the inclusion in the Act of a requirement that children’s views should be taken
into account when considering ‘significant decisions’, schools are under no
legal obligation to consult children on everyday matters (see Tisdall et al.
forthcoming). As well as this ‘special’ status afforded to schools, the Scottish
guidance and legislation (like that in England) (Bell 1993) allow children’s
opinions to be overlooked on the grounds of ‘safety’ (when inclusion in
decision making processes could harm the child) or ‘competency’ (when the
child is not thought capable of understanding the process).4
These provisos are not special to Scotland. There are, as Lee (1999)
points out, ambiguities to be found in articles of the UN Convention on
the Rights of the Child and subsequent national legislation. He suggests that
these ambiguities centre around the way that legislation defers the question
of children’s competency to represent themselves. In this paper we attempt
to address the gap that Lee has highlighted. We employ ethnographic data
from an ESRC funded project, ‘Life as a Disabled Child’, to discuss how
adults actually judge competency in everyday settings.5 By examining how
disabled children’s views are already taken into account by various adults
we are able to illustrate the variety of ways in which disabled children are
judged competent. By comparing these everyday processes to writing on
3 In terms of competency and maturity, The Children (Scotland) Act, drawing on Article
12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, states that attention must be given to a
child’s views subject to the child’s age and maturity. In Scottish Law, a child of 12 years of age
or more is usually deemed of sufficient age and maturity to form a view. Younger children’s
views will be taken into account where they exhibit ‘sufficient understanding’ (Marshall 1997).
However, the Act itself is unclear over how competency is assessed or who assesses it.
4 Marshall (1997) indicates that in a Children’s Hearing when an issue of ‘safety’ arises
a parent, judge, or ‘safeguarder may decide what action is in the best interests of the child.
However, Marshall (1997) also points out that young people have suggested that those with-
holding information should also consider the effects on the child of the child uncovering
sensitive information by accident.
5 In the interest of confidentiality we do not provide any further information regarding the
schools we attended. The study involved participant observation in school and home settings
and informal interviews with children and adults. Readers interested in our research methods
should see Davis et al. (2000) and Davis (1998), Davis (2000).
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children’s rights we are able to contribute to discussions concerning such
issues as: who should decide competency, where and how should compet-
ency be assessed, over what time span should a judgement be made and what
criteria should be employed. Following this discussion we highlight a number
of cases of good practice in relation to competency and self-empowerment
amongst disabled children. These cases enable us to demonstrate that disabled
children, whatever their impairment, can be competent participants in every
day decision making processes when they are provided with opportunities to
interact with other children on an equitable basis, their participation is prop-
erly planned and not reliant on short term adult assessments of competency,
and when they are able to work with reflexive adults. By this we mean adults
who understand that disabled children, like other children and adults, are
flexible social beings whose behavioural patterns, communication abilities,
level of involvement and level of interest will vary over the duration of an
activity.
By discussing children’s rights within the context of everyday social inter-
action, this paper contrasts with much of the literature which deals with
children’s rights in the UK.6 This, in the main, tends to focus on specific
issues such as procedures in children’s panels, the use of child witnesses or
children’s participation in particular legal scenarios and such distinctive and
sometimes quite rare events as divorce, adoption, offending and kidnapping
overseas.
Our analysis is located within the somewhat more mundane everyday
life experiences of children within educational and residential institutions.
By investigating children’s rights in this context we are able to conclude
that, although legislation and guidance is important, it will only afford
disabled children protection when combined with more local innovation.
This should encourage adults and children to understand their interdepend-
encies, act in more equitable ways, and, practise better forms of dialogue and
communication.
Judging competency: How, who and where?
Most of the guidance and legislation in Scotland that cover the rights of
disabled children and their right to have their voice heard and opinions
taken into account are also covered by a proviso that the children should
exhibit competency. In our experience competency is denied to many disabled
children in different day-to-day settings by a variety of adults. In many of
the research settings we found little evidence that children were perceived
6 With the exception of writers such as Alderson (2000).
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as active social agents capable of making choices. As one care worker told
us:
They find it very difficult to make up their own minds. We have to tell
them what they want to do, help them decide.
We soon came to learn that very often children were denied agency not
because they were incapable of making choices, but simply because their
ability to make choices went unrecognised. In the following extract, the same
care worker is talking to Sam:
Sam carries on with tidying up, he knows where everything is and where
it goes but keeps on asking me to do things for him. I refuse and he carries
on and finishes the task. The helper comes in and sees what Sam is doing
and says to me:
Helper: “He’s quite a good man, needs to be directed but he can do it.
Aren’t you Sam? Sam are you going to do relaxation after Tea?”
Sam: “I hate relaxation” (clearly and emphatically). Helper: “Sam if
you don’t come up with something you’ll have to do it.”
The care worker infringes the rights of Sam by not listening to his views.
Impairment is used to justify this denial of rights. In this case, it is because
Sam has a learning difficulty and, consequently, is not perceived as being
competent. Previously, we have argued that disabled children are not seen as
competent because they are seen as different, ‘not like us’ (Davis and Watson,
in press a). This difference arises because the children are judged against
supposedly objective criteria. For example, the children are seen as not being
able to achieve set attainment targets and levels, they are seen as being unable
to communicate and interact with their peer group and others and they are
seen as being unsafe, a danger to both themselves and those who work with
them. We have further argued that these criteria, far from being objective, are
subjective and are often imposed unreflexively (Davis et al. 2000).
As Lee (1999) points out, the deferral of decisions of competency brought
about by various legislation means that certain children (in his case child
witnesses) are put under a lot of pressure to prove their competency. We
would argue that many of the disabled children we met were persistently
put under the same type of pressure and that perhaps this occurred because
they were subjected to adult surveillance on a more routine basis. However,
we would not want to mark disabled children as completely different from
other children because we are also aware that childhood in the UK is often
considered to be a vulnerable time (Jenks 1996) and therefore, that it is likely
that all children’s competency is constantly under review by adults.
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Very often the persistent review of disabled children’s competency leads
to disagreement between children, their parents and different professionals.
For example, in the following extract Joe’s mother talks about the conflicting
perspectives of Joe’s condition:
If the teachers have got this perceived idea that the child is thick, they pass
that onto the child and therefore the child picks that up and they actually
tell themselves that they are thick. Now Joe especially, we had that with
Joe. When he first went to see the neurologist, and the neurologist asked
him a few questions, his answer to the neurologist was, ‘Oh, I cannae dae
that, I’m thick.’ The neurologist looked at me as if to say ‘Have you been
telling him he is thick?’ Then she said to him, ‘Who told you that, Joe?’
And he turned round and says to her ‘[My teacher] told me I’m thick.’
And you know what it took? Years to get him to break that. Years. We
were constantly at home telling him, ‘Yes, you can do it son, just take
your time, you’ll manage’. And he was going intae class the next day, and
she was saying, ‘You’re thick, totally stupid’. So therefore, whatever we
were doing at home, was being broken the next day at the school.
Here, a picture is drawn of a teacher who has not only made up her mind
that Joe lacks competency but intends to reinforce that perspective on a daily
basis. She also fails to explore and develop new techniques that might enable
him to achieve his full potential. As a consequence of Joe’s consultation with
the neurologist he was diagnosed with ‘severe dyslexia’ and eventually he
received different educational provision. Through these interventions, he was
given back competency, his behaviour was understood and, whilst he was still
seen as different, he was no longer seen as incapable of agency.
Competency, therefore takes on a temporal role, it is situated and fluid.
Though the teacher has a fixed view of Joe as ‘thick’, Joe and other people
interpret his behaviour differently. There are multiple competing versions of
the real Joe7 which different adults employ when deciding how to interact
with him. Here, Joe and his mother’s sense of injustice relates to the fact that
they feel the teacher has been unwilling to question her perception of Joe.
Children often told us that they felt some adults had a distorted view of them
and their capabilities and that this could create tension between them and their
teachers, as in this example with Jane, who was also diagnosed as dyslexic:
When a wis in primary school there was this girl picked on mi and shi
stole ma shoes and chucked them away in the woods an a told the head
7 See Corker and Davis (2001) for an example of how competing versions of the real in
one setting such as the school are related to information known about a child in other settings
such as the home.
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teacher and she niver believed mi, like she thought a done it ma sell and
she told ma mum ad made it up.
Whether a child’s version of their experiences was respected owed much to
whether the listening adult could set aside the label attributed to the child
(their willingness to look beyond the child’s impairment), the extent to which
the cultural atmosphere of the setting allowed the child’s problems to be
addressed (the willingness and ability on the part of adults to believe the
child and act on what the child said) and the existence of relevant organisation
structures (the ability of the adults to implement, for example, anti-bullying
policies within the setting).
Very often adults’ assumptions stem from a lack of dialogue which occurs
because an adult refuses to adapt their first impressions of a child or because
they fail to enter into dialogue with the child to investigate if their assump-
tions hold any water. In the following example, George, a boy with severe
multiple impairments, is denied competency because the teacher fails to ask
a few simple questions:
In ‘symbol class’ the children are doing a story about Simon and the
symbols. They have to interpret symbols and say what they mean. In this
example they are asked to say ‘Simon likes to go out with his dad.’
Teacher: (To John as an aside but in front of the class) George’s got a
brother called Simon, so we’re not too sure if this isn’t confusing.
At the end of the class, John, having earlier been told by the teacher that
she thinks that George has little cognitive ability, very little capacity for
memory and that he responds ‘parrot-fashion’ to questions, investigates
for himself:
John: ‘George whose dads is this? Is it yours?’
George: Dad.
John: A knows it’s a dad but whose dad is it?
George: Simon’s.
John: Was it your friend’s dad.
George: Yes.
The teacher here fails to consult with George, to check out if he understands
what the symbols mean. Based on her pre-conceptions of George’s ability,
she assumes incompetence and attempts to pass this assumption onto John.
However, John investigates for himself and finds that George is fully aware
of who is being talked about, indeed so much so that a few days later John
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checked with George again and found that he still remembered that it was
his friend’s father that they had been talking about. Here, George not only
establishes his own competency but he also scotches the myths surrounding
his capacity to remember things. He does so because he and John are able to
develop a dialogue, something the teacher does not do. That is, they are able
(as Lee 1999 recommends) locally to resolve the ambiguities surrounding
George’s competency through face to face discussion. This requires negoti-
ations between adult and child which are dependent on the context and the
attitudes and patterns of behaviour of the adults present (Davis 1998; Roche
1999; Davis et al. 2000). It also requires a shift in the power relations between
adults and children, underpinned by reflexive practice. This shift requires the
adult to assume responsibility when communication breaks down by posing
the question ‘what did I do wrong?’. It is less important who judges compe-
tency,8 than whether that person is able to acknowledge that their personal
and professional perspectives may cloud that decision.9
Within this context adults may fail to attribute agency to children if they
are unable or unwilling to take into account the effect of power relations
between themselves and the children they work with. Implicit in the lack of
dialogue between George and his teacher is a power relationship. The teacher,
by deciding not to ask George more questions, disempowers him at the same
time as privileging her own knowledge. Davis (1998, 2000) argues that those
who work with children and disabled people should not revere them for their
simplicity and assume that their cultural norms are somewhat lesser to their
own. He suggests that those working with disabled children have much to
gain from adopting flexible roles that enable them to reposition themselves as
‘learner’. However, opportunities for learning tend to be obstructed where the
enquirer (such as the teacher above) does not question his or her own assump-
tions and assumes ignorance in others, whilst failing to consider whether
they themselves are ignorant. Those who are to assess competency in others
should first be reflexive about their own prejudices. Moreover, they should
8 There is much opportunity for professionals, parents and children to be set against each
other in relation to both judgements of competency and decisions concerning a child’s welfare,
though for example the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991 affirms the medical profes-
sionals’ right to judge competency this could be challenged in the court and a judge may
overturn a decision by evoking another part of the guidance or legislation. (See Bell (1993)
for a discussion of this occurrence in England in relation to the Gillick case, James and James
(1999) for a discussion of the problems of the court being the final arbitrator and Morrow and
Richards (1996) and Alderson (1995) for further discussion of the Gillick case and the ethics
of including children in decision making processes.)
9 However, we also believe that a child, parent, other relative, friend, and various profes-
sionals should all play a part in the process of judging competency. Indeed this would not be
too innovative an idea within the context of law because, at present in Scotland, all of these
people can represent a child in a children’s hearing (Marshall 1997).
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question the appropriateness of the criteria by which they judge compe-
tency.
Marshall (1997) equates competency with the ability of a child to state
a preference but she is aware that other professionals, such as educational
psychologists, may have different perspectives from her. There has been
much recent criticisms of developmental psychology and ‘medical model’
tendencies to judge disabled children by ablest test criteria (Shakespeare and
Watson 1998; Priestley 1998). At the centre of this criticism is the belief
that it is wrong to pathologise disabled children because they do not achieve
specific age related targets. Further, the testing of children is centred around
Anglo-centric notions of normality which do not account for culture and
context (Woodhead 1998; Woodhead and Faulkner 2000; Alderson 2000).
As Alderson states when discussing measures of ‘normality’ in comparison
to measures of average height expectancy:
Abilities are similarly measured for ‘normality’ without taking much
account of how much children’s abilities vary depending on how and
where they are tested, how much help with the task or previous experience
they have, and many other factors. Thus, ability is turned into a static
thing, instead of being seen as widely varying responses depending on
the context and relationships concerned. (2000: 55)
It would appear that many who measure for ‘normality’ forget that children
are flexible social actors (James and Prout 1995) and that they behave differ-
ently depending on the social context and who is present. Cockburn (1998)
tells us that: ‘Incompetence is not something natural or innate but is socially
produced : : :’ (p. 109) ‘It is necessary to replace binary characterizations of
people such as immature/developed; mobile/disabled; competent/incapable;
included/excluded, and adopt less dichotomized ways of identifying people’
(p. 111). These authors are arguing against fixed notions of competency in
childhood and they are supported by some psychologists who are critical of
practices within their own paradigm.
Woodhead and Faulkner (2000) point out that researchers within the devel-
opmental paradigm have, by contemporary standards, been neglectful of the
‘rights, feelings and potential of young participants as social actors’ (p. 13).
They point out, citing Donaldson (1978) in relation to the work of Piaget,
that when the context of a test is changed children are observed to demon-
strate more ‘sophisticated’ reasoning than Piaget had claimed and (drawing
on Vygotsky) that laboratory studies of children often ignore the social
construction of knowledge and the impact of the presence of the psycholo-
gist and other children on the child being assessed. As such, these works
bring into question whether there can be such a thing as an objective test
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of competency and warn us not to privilege one academic paradigm over
others.
Elsewhere we have argued that crucial to the process of developing
avenues of communication is the amount of time an adult spends getting
to know a child (Davis et al. 2000). On our project many hours of partic-
ipant observation were carried out (at home and in school) with the various
children who participated in the project. By visiting the children over a
number of months, and seeing them with different people in different settings,
we learned a lot about the variability of their lives. As such, we would caution
against the use of short term, one visit, tickbox, assessments of competency.
A person visiting a disabled child for a few moments on a specific day might
gain a completely different impression of the child’s abilities than if they had
visited at another time. Not least as Davis et al. (2000) point out, because
automatic co-operation with strangers might not be a behavioural pattern that
the disabled child (or anyone other child, Trisiliotis et al. 1995) wishes to
comply with. Many disabled children are aware that adults pathologise them
on the basis of apparently objective biological, educational, social or cultural
criteria (as Tommy will point out below). Hence, as a result of this it should
not be assumed that disabled children’s non-compliance, silence, or resistance
is a sign of incompetence.
We not only found that children’s behaviour varied, but we also found that
not all the adults who work with children in institutional settings exhibit the
same behavioural patterns. Often members of staff highlighted differences
between themselves and their colleagues. For example, one teacher described
to us what she called the ‘She doesn’t like Ribena syndrome’:
Children come here aged four to five and on their first day here are offered
the choice between Ribena and orange juice. The child chooses orange
and its assumed forever more that they don’t like Ribena and they are
never again given the choice.
This anecdote serves to illustrate that value systems develop over time, and
that staff have long term knowledge of the children, which, if used unreflex-
ively, inhibits the ascription of competence. This also serves to warn us that
although those who have worked longest with disabled children may be best
placed to judge competency, this will only be of benefit to the child, if the
adult does not resort to stereotyping.
Relationships between staff and children were built up over many days,
months and in some cases years and we found that competence was often
denied to those children who an adult, for whatever reason, did not like.
George, for example was seen as a particularly troublesome child, people
commented on how difficult he was to toilet, to lift in and out of his chair and
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to feed. Some staff developed fixed, unyielding notions about the children
based on either their own past relationship with that child or from knowledge
inherited from colleagues. As well as competence being ascribed on past and
present knowledge of the child, it was also based on adult perceptions of what
a child might achieve in the future:
We know that they are not going to get jobs after they leave here, so why
does it matter if they can’t tell blue from red. OK its good they know but I
think it’s more important they have fun when they are here. (care worker)
Although this comment might be interpreted as philanthropic, it is, in effect a
denial of the right to education. Again, this statement relates to the notion
that these children will not achieve universal developmental targets, and,
consequently, are incompetent. We are particularly concerned that children
who are already judged as lacking because they have failed to meet devel-
opmental targets in their past and present childhood, are denied competency
because adults perceive them to be incapable of achieving specific outcomes
in their futures. Our concern relates to the potential that this judgement
becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.
As above, the process through which these judgements occur is related to
the context where adult-child interaction takes place. For example, elsewhere
we have discussed how streaming within schools affects the way adults and
children attribute status to each other’s beliefs and actions (Davis and Watson
in press a). We also found that competency in a residential setting was judged
more on social ability than academic ability. As a care worker told us:
It’s more their physical capabilities we’re looking at rather than their
academic ability. It’s more their social awareness and interpersonal skills.
All these data point to a social construction of competency and maturity
across sites, across people and across belief systems. This suggests that if
disabled children are to be afforded rights in various settings, rather than
searching for a universally accepted criteria by which to assess competency, it
may be better simply to assume that all children of what ever age and maturity
are capable of contributing to discussions concerning their lives, and place the
emphasis on developing techniques10 and avenues of communication which
make this possible.
10 Within this context it should not be automatically assumed that the ‘best’ techniques
for listening to children are to be found in the new sociology of childhood. As argued else
where (Davis 1998; Davis et al. 2000) these techniques are only as good as the reflexivity
of the person who employs them and they may be alien to many children due to cultural or
biological factors.
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This will be a difficult task, as it will require the transformation of
child-adult relations (Roche 1997). However, it will not necessarily be an
impossible task because children are already a central component of social
relations (Cockburn 1998) and, as we shall demonstrate below, examples of
good practice already exist which can be utilised to encourage more equitable
relations between adults and children.
Supporting children to speak for themselves: Competency and self
empowerment
So far we have dealt with negative experiences concerning issues of compet-
ency and disabled children and our concerns surrounding the way in which
competency might be established. It is important to note that the negative
cases we have used above are not the end of the story and we have
encountered a few examples of good practice in school and residential
settings. In this section we document examples where disabled children were
assumed to be competent and illustrate how this assumption enabled them to
empower themselves in relation to making choices about issues concerning
their lives. In so doing, our aim will be to highlight the need not only to afford
disabled children rights in various settings, but to set up structures and ways
of working with disabled children which enable them to confront disabling
practices themselves.
We illustrate three different approaches to self-empowerment. In each
case, processes of empowerment are instigated by adults and involve children
participating in different ways. There are two key elements in all these
examples. The first is that the adults question their own interpretation of the
child’s behaviour; the second is that they offer the child the opportunity to
state their own views.
First, is the example of Wilbur, a child diagnosed with Asperger’s
Syndrome who was under threat of exclusion from his mainstream school.
This example is, initially, completely controlled by adults. Wilbur’s behaviour
had started to deteriorate and, in one term, he had seven letters of referral from
various teachers all complaining about his behaviour. However, one teacher
submitted three letters that described how his behaviour had improved and
also pointed out that he was being bullied by other boys in the class and how
other children were leading him astray and using him. The school set up a
monitoring system and observed him for a term (twice a week) and came to
the conclusion that his behaviour was a result of his reaction to other children.
They decided not to recommend he move to a special school. This sort of
example enabled us to realise that sometimes listening is actually seeing,
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giving competency is as much about observing the children as it is about
listening to them (see also Corker and Davis 1999).
In our interviews with Wilbur he told us how much he liked the school
and felt that it responded to his needs. In the following extract the difference
between his experience and that of Jane, above is made clear.
John: You were saying you get bullied?
Wilbur: Well if they hit, hit me, and stuff like that then they just run away.
They know that, they know that, know that an adult’s coming. They run
away.
John: So is there a structure in the school – like a way of?
Wilbur: Well they pick it up quickly here – They just excluded straight
away.
John: Right. So it’s quite strict. Well that’s my word. But do you think
that’s an appropriate response?
Wilbur: Yeah. ‘Cause I was getting bullied and he was just taken up to the
office, and he got excluded straight away cause this school, they’re dead
against bullying.
This, however, takes time. Wilbur was observed for twenty hours and some
staff were also prepared to accept his behavioural difference and not to
pathologise his behaviour as essential and innate. They did not automati-
cally assume that his behaviour was caused by his impairment. As such, their
approach was more progressive than that of most of the adults in other schools
we visited.
In contrast to this example where adults took an active role in assessing
Wilbur’s competence, in the next example we describe how Tommy, a boy
with a mobility impairment, tried to overcome the prejudice and discrimina-
tion that he was experiencing in his new school. Here, Tommy and various
adults work together in an attempt to highlight Tommy’s competency to his
peer group.
Tommy lived outside the usual catchment area of this school, but went
there because of its accessibility; consequently, at first, he did not know any
of the other pupils. Since arriving at his new school, Tommy had felt unable to
make any friends, he felt excluded by all his peer group and was not enjoying
himself. His solution to the problem, which was negotiated with both his
teacher and his mother, was to talk to his class about who he was and what
it meant to him to be a disabled child. The other pupils asked him questions
about himself and, throughout the discussion with his classmates, he kept on
reiterating how he didn’t feel any different from them. For example, one boy
asked him ‘What can’t you do?’ he replied:
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I’m actually the same as anybody else : : : most people think that disabled
people sit in their homes crying because we wish we were like them. But I
don’t do that. It doesn’t affect me. It doesn’t affect my personality. I think,
what you see is me. I don’t want to be any different.
Most of the children wanted to know what he couldn’t do; could he get
up stairs, could he draw, do PE, and so on. Some of the questions made
us, as researchers, uncomfortable. They could be described as prurient, as
invasive. Tommy talked about how he didn’t like being stared at, yet what
was happening here was the equivalent. We questioned the ethics behind this
enterprise. However, if we accept that Tommy is a competent agent capable
of making up his own mind and putting his own point of view across, then do
we have to accept the validity of his choice? As Tommy said at the end of his
talk
I’ve really enjoyed being able to talk. Do you think you’ve learned
anything?
To which the whole class replied ‘Yes’. In a later interview Tommy was asked
if he felt that his talk had had any long-term effect. He replied ‘People are
more relaxed with me. Beginning to chat and so on, on things and they will
listen but only to a short thing’. Following the talk he had gone out with a
number of his classmates to the cinema and for day trips into the city centre.
In that respect, it had been a success. However, it had also been a strain on
him and he later commented about how he didn’t want to spend his whole life
‘battering down walls’.
This example is important because it illustrates that in the everyday flux of
disabled children’s lives the way that guidance and legislation deal with issues
of competency are unimportant in comparison to assessment by peer group.
We would also suggest that this is the case for non-disabled children. Thus,
though the guidance and legislation which underpin children’s rights are
important because they set precedents and act as stimulants for change, they
do not in themselves enable children to have rights. What enables children to
exercise rights is acceptance by other children and adults. Children’s rights
are intertwined with relationships and anything, which enables the establish-
ment and maintenance of empowering relationships, will also act to support
the rights of children.
This finding is supported by the data in our final example which, when
compared to our early example of George, demonstrates that children,
whatever their impairment, when given the right circumstances, are capable
of agency and competency. Here, we present some edited field notes from
a weekly committee set up by children and young people in a residential
setting. The children range in age from 13 to 17 and include children with
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learning difficulties and other impairments. It is a large data extract, but is
included to show the extent to which the children and young people are able
to come to their own decisions. A care worker (Bill) facilitated the group.
The children themselves had set up their own ground rules for the group
to ensure that all the members were heard. They took it in turns to chair
the meeting and in this meeting Suzie, a girl with learning difficulties, was
chairing:
Suzie’s leading it and Gary says “I want to do something next Tuesday.”
Joe says, “But I’m away on that day.” And they say, “Yeah, it’ll be quite
nice to go out to a café.” But Joe wants to go, so Bill, rather than inter-
vening, gets the two boys to negotiate and to decide on what day they
want to go. The meeting is held up again because they suddenly realise
that Cindy isn’t there. So they all wait for Cindy to turn up. And Suzie
says, “Now Cindy’s here, we’ll start the meeting.” Which seems very
confident and is kind of breaking down my original view of her. She’s
very capable of doing this, taking on this role. It’s just that she has a
different way of behaving. Jerome prints out in handwriting what’s been
said in the meeting and Lucy types it out in Braille. The first thing Suzie
talks about is African Café and Joe says, “When is it on?” And Suzie
doesn’t answer the question but says, “They’ve got a Braille news there.”
Lucy says, “The problem is what kind of food do they have?” And Joanne
says, “Here’s the menu.” Gary reads it out “There’s ostrich on the menu”.
Cindy says, “Ooh that’s terrible. I’m not going.” Bill intervenes and says,
“It could be quite good to go on Tuesday the 20th, but some of you are
away.” Suzie asks “What about tonight? Cindy, Kerry, Lucy and me are
going out tonight for a walk. Maybe we could go to the restaurant as well
and try it out and tell you about it.” Kerry says “Oh, we can just get a bus
round.” [Discussions continue and they talk about going to the cinema at
a later date] Lucy says “Wait a minute. That means that, that Cindy’ll be
on her own here for half an hour.” Cindy interrupts and says, “That’s ok
I’m used to that.”
Another child, Fanny says that there’s a musical called the Sound of
Boogie Nights and she really wants to go. The children pick up on this
and immediately say it would be a good idea. But again they had to enter
into the negotiation of what day to go and that was quite interesting. Once
they’d worked out a day Gary said, “Who’s going to get the tickets?” Bill
said, “Would you like to do it?” Gary, “Yeah I’ll do it. We’ll walk up there
one evening this week and I’ll do that.” The adults only rarely organise
something, once they decide to do something the children have to go and
get the tickets.
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In this example, Bill has allowed the children to make up their own minds,
and they were able to negotiate their way through some fairly complex issues
and ensure that the voices of all the members of the group were attended
to. These data clearly show that, in the right circumstances and if given the
opportunity, these children are capable and competent.
The way ahead
Through these data excerpts we have shown how, in many cases, despite the
existence of legislation such as the Children (Scotland) Act, disabled children
are often denied competency and their opinions are often ignored. We are
not in a position to state if this is unique to disabled children or is simply
a reflection of how all children are treated (our instincts would suggest the
latter). However, what it does show is that despite the laying down of a
procedural base for the bureaucratisation of children’s rights, in the mundane,
day-to-day lifeworld of disabled children, these rights are often denied. The
Children (Scotland) Act creates legislation and sets up a discourse which
suggests that children’s rights must be taken into account, but it appears to act
more as an appeal to progressive change rather than an effective mechanism
to achieve such change. It provides a discourse behind which people can
claim that they are doing something but does not allocate an effective voice to
disabled children. This situation is compounded by the fact that much of the
legislation surrounding children’s rights is set within guidelines and not laws
and, therefore, does not afford disabled children, or non-disabled children,
strong protection (Tisdall 2000, personal correspondence)
The solution may, at first glance appear to be a widening and tightening
of legislation, so as to ensure that the rights of disabled children are met.
Yet as Mason (2000) has argued, legislation is often ignored. It frequently
only sets minimum ethical standards and does not provide protection, except
in extreme cases. Further legislation may only serve to increase the distance
between disabled children and non-disabled adults, or it may do more harm
than good (James and James 1999).
We would argue for a multi-layered approach to disabled children’s rights,
which as well as a strengthening of present guidance and legislation would
require local authorities to invest in a number of training programmes for all
staff. These programmes should include: equality training, a greater emphasis
on reflexivity and an encouragement to question everyday practices. As Lee
(1998) points out, central to this process would be the identification of ambi-
guities at the local level and face to face negotiation between the children and
adults present. We would look for more sophisticated local ways to uphold
the rights of children. Indeed, in the cases highlighted above, good practice
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occurred in different settings (school classrooms and residential units), with
children with different impairments and with staff from different professional
backgrounds (teachers, teaching assistants, care assistants, social workers).
The legislation and guidance which encourages adults to include children
were different in each location, yet the children and adults present did not
allow those factors to deflect themselves from trying to create a more equit-
able environment through observation and dialogue. In a Durkheimian (1964)
sense we are arguing that because rules are interpreted at the local level, the
opportunity arises for good practitioners to emerge who are able to interpret
the rules in ways that benefit the children. This is in keeping with those who
argue that good practitioners are often adept at adapting rules in particular
contexts (Jordan 1994).
The examples of good practice illustrated above required the adults
working in each location to be proactive. Their aim, particularly in the
case of Wilbur, was to prevent relations deteriorating to the point where
the law might be invoked. We would suggest that it is crucial that disabled
children should not have to seek judgments in the courts against education
authorities because their rights are not recognised. Going to court is often
painful and, because of the lack of disability awareness in legal settings, is
an extremely risky processes. There is considerable debate as to whether
legislation ever provides disabled children with protection of their rights.
Corker and Davis (2001) have argued that there is little mention of the rights
of disabled children in the various books about children and the law; the
dominant discourse in law views disabled children in terms of dependency,
vulnerability and protection and that law in itself is very often individualising
and dehumanising. They also illustrate, as we have, that despite some cases
of good practice, local interpretations of the law and policy result in ‘wide
spread abuses of the human and civil rights of disabled children and the
silencing of their voices, rendering them invisible under the law’.
Hence, as well as legislation and guidance, what is required is that those
who work in institutions are encouraged to communicate and negotiate more
effectively with children. We are not only arguing for structural change at
national and local levels, we also believe that children themselves can be
central to the processes of change. Our hope is that examples such as the ones
above, where children are entrusted to create their own self-empowerment,
can become an everyday occurrence. We are, however, not trying to promote
the concept of an autonomous child (Cockburn 1998). In contrast to this
construct (and in keeping with Cockburn 1998), we believe that the examples
we have employed above demonstrate the need for co-operation between
adult and child. However, this process requires trust to develop between adults
and children and this is not helped by discourses which assume children are
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sources of trouble (Roche 1999), or which judge children against normative
standards and future potentials. It will require a rethinking of the language of
rights and citizenship. As Roche writes:
We need to think through the terms on which participation is being
offered, to be aware of the context in which children are being ‘invited
in’ and the risk of responsibility for making a decision being thrust upon
children in circumstances not of their choosing. The languages of partici-
pation and empowerment are cosy but we need to be more critical of the
circumstances of inclusion and the kinds of adult support (e.g. advocacy
and representations) that children might need. (1999: 489)
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